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The main purpose of this thesis is to use Artificial Neural network as a tool to monitor 
system health and performance. In other word Using ANN can increase the system awareness 
and can be used as a tool to mitigate cascade failure in power grid due to loss of communication 
in a critical power node and as a result avoid catastrophic phenomena like electric blackout.  In 
this thesis, a modified IEEE 30 bus system is used as a system under study. Modified IEE 30 bus 
system is IEEE 30 bus system in which 2 sets of its synchronous condensers changed to act as 
synchronous generator. Results of load flow analysis of modified IEEE 30 bus system is used to 
train ANN.  
Electric power grid and communication system are interdependent. In other words, 
electric power grid relies on communication network to transmit control signal and from other 
side communication network relies on power grid to supply its required electricity for operation. 
Failure in a node in one of the interdependent networks may lead to failure of dependent nodes 
on the other network. If the failure is not very fast identified  and the required actions did  not 
taken place, the failure propagates in both networks and may lead to electric black out.  
ANN is used to monitor the Vpu of some specific voltage buses in power grid and based 
on the difference between observed and desired value it can decide whether the communication 
has been failed due to the failure in communication network or the bus bar voltage is deviated 
due to outage of generator at that specific node.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Motivation  
Currently, control of electric power grid relies on a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) system. SCADA system does not have the capability to collect all data 
and process them and send the required decision in real time. But hopefully through full 
development of smart grids, a Wide-Area Measurement System (WAMS) may be realized, 
which mostly relies on new technologies such as phase Measurement Units (PMUs) and Sensor 
and Actuator Networks (SANETs) to collect real time data, and send them to the control centers 
for making online control decisions. It is obvious that control of future electric power grids will 
be more complex and dependent on communication networks. So it is imperative to study and 
analyze the interdependency of the power grid and the communication network. 
Modern complex networks are coupled together and should be modeled as an 
interdependent network. A basic characteristic of interdependent networks is that a failure of 
nodes in one network may lead to failure of a dependent node in the other network. This may 
happen repeatedly and may lead to a cascaded failure. A real life example of cascaded failure is 
blackout in electric power systems. Electric power grid and communication network have 
bidirectional interdependency. In other words, the electric power grid depends on the 
communication network for transmitting control signals, and on the other side, the 
communication network depends on the electric power grid for their electricity supply. The root 
cause for most of the wide scale blackouts that occurred in the past has been lack of situational 
awareness. In this thesis, artificial intelligence will be used to boost the visibility of distribution 




1.2 2003 blackout in Italy  
In [1], the Italian blackout of 2003 has been studied. This blackout was the result of a 
cascade of failures between the power grid and the communication network. In fact, due to 
failures in the power grid, some of the switches in the communication network lost their power 
and failed. Subsequently, due to failures in the communication network, some of the substations 
in the power grid lost their control, and failed. They also demonstrate that failures inside the 
power grid lead to failures in the communication network using simulations on real data of the 
Italian network. 
1.3 2003 blackout in Northeast America and Canada  
In August 2003, lack of real-time monitoring and rapid control decisions for mitigating 
failures led to a catastrophic blackout, which affected 50 million people in Northeast America. 
According to the final report of the 2003 blackout [2], this blackout started with the loss of three 
transmission lines in Ohio. However, the operators did not realize these failures due to 
insufficient monitoring; thus, no remedial action was taken at that time which triggered a very 
fast cascade, and led to a full blackout in the Northeast United States and parts of Canada. The 
reports in [3] and [4] indicate that the reason for tripping of many generators and transmission 
lines was power imbalance in the control areas and lack of communication between the operators 
for mitigating the failures. 
Table 1.1: Sequence of key failures over time [5] 
Monitoring  
14:02 Transmission line disconnects in southwestern Ohio 
15:05:41 - 15:41:33 Transmission lines disconnect between eastern Ohio and northern 
Ohio 





16:08:58 - 16:10:27 Transmission lines into northwestern Ohio disconnect, 
and generation trips in central Michigan 
16:10:00 - 16:10:38 Transmission lines disconnect across Michigan and northern Ohio, 
generation trips off line in northern Michigan and 
northern Ohio, and northern Ohio separates from Pennsylvania 
16:10:40 - 16:10:44 4 Four transmission lines disconnect between Pennsylvania 
and New York 
16:10:41 Transmission line disconnects and generation trips in northern 
Ohio 
16:10:42 - 16:10:45 Transmission paths disconnect in northern Ontario and 
New Jersey, isolating the northeast portion of the Eastern 
Interconnection 
16:10:46 - 16:10:55 New York splits east-to-west. New England (except southwestern 
Connecticut) and the Maritimes separate from New York and 
remain intact 
16:10:50 - 16:11:57 Ontario separates from NY west of Niagara Falls and west of St. 
Lawrence. Southwestern Connecticut separates from NY and black 
out 
16:13 Cascade Completed 
 
1.4 Our Contribution  
The main issue that has been investigated in this thesis is the effect of real power 
injection from synchronous generators and the impact of that on reduction of system active 
power losses, where the set points of these generators are generated using artificial neural 
networks, which is also deployed to analyze the health of the system under study.  
Communication devices within the power grid are powered from power nodes, meaning that if 
we lose a power node we lose a communication node too. 
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Now imagine this scenario: a communication device is powered by a generator at a 
specific bus, and is periodically communicating with the control center. If this communication is 
lost at this node, then there are two possibilities: 
1. Loss of communication only, the but generator is still injecting power to the distribution 
network: first, we want to distinguish whether this is just a loss of communication or 
generator, so using a trained artificial neural network (NN), we obtained the Vpu/angles 
for some specific buses and compared the predicted vs the actual values. If the error is 
within a pre-defined margin, then this is a confirmation that this is only a communication 
loss. While the system awaits a remedial action to fix this issue, the load may vary which 
requires different set points for the other generators in order to minimize the active power 
losses, and again compare Vpu of the predicted vs actual for the new set points. 
2. Loss of communication due to loss of a generator at that specific bus: in this case, while 
comparing the Vpu predicted versus Vpu actual, a big difference will be noticed, which 
tells us that the generator is not injecting power, so this allows the control system to open 
the designated breaker and shed the load if needed. Once a proper action is taken, we can 
again use the NN to find the optimal set points of the remaining generators that will result 
in a minimal active power loss and continue to monitor the health of the system. 
In order to do the analysis, the IEEE 30 BUS system from ETAP along with Matlab code 
were used to run the load flow, where appendices A through D show the IEEE 30 Bus data, 
schematics, and Matlab code.  IEEE 30 Bus has only two synchronous generators, one of which 
is used as a slack bus. In addition, there are five synchronous condensers that inject reactive 
power to the system, so 2 sync condensers were modified into sync gen, which will allow us to 
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control the active power of 3 generators, so the whole system becomes a modified IEEE 30 Bus 
System. 
The important question was which of the condensers need to be changed to synchronous 
generators. In order to find the answer to this question, the load flow analysis was performed and 
the condensers near Buses/Lines that experience higher MW losses (compared to the rest of the 
system) were selected to be generators. 
In order to have minimum active power loss in the system, the controller needs to find 
optimal generation set points for the synchronous generators while limiting their reactive power 
a constant. Obviously, finding the optimal set point for generation needs substantial computation 
time/complexity since it requires running the load flow for many different combinations. In our 
approach, we used Artificial Neural Network (feed forward back propagation) to find the optimal 
generation set points. The neural network was trained offline with a large number of load flow 
solutions. 
In summary, neural network can be used to predict what would be system MW losses at 
any combination of generation set points between 0 & 100 MW, which produce results with 
minimal error. However, if the load profile changes considerably (for example if it multiplies by 
1.5 factors) then the neural network error becomes significant. To overcome this, different neural 
networks are trained with different load factors namely 1.5 & 2 load factors.  
Therefore, by using neural network MW losses of system and the voltage at every bus can be 
calculated. The voltage at each bus is corresponding to a certain combination of generator set 
points so that optimal generation set points that will minimize MW losses can be found. 
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  As a result, ANN can be used to monitor the health of the system through per unit bus 
voltage because for each generation combination, we have a corresponding Vpu per bus. If a 
deviation between expected and actual value is noticed, it would alarm us that there is something 
wrong in system operation and a proper action is required. 
It is important to note that for a big system it may not be practical to monitor Vpu or 
angle of each bus using ANN. There must be a few critical buses in the system that can tell a lot 
about the health of the whole system. So, we need to reduce the number of busses that we are 
monitoring. If we monitor buses near or at the generators, the Vpu is 1 or close to 1, this does not 
tell us a lot about the entire system. Therefore, we need to look for buses whose Vpu reacts more 
significantly to changing generators set points.  In this thesis, a statistical index called the 
interquartile range (IQR), which is basically a measurement of variability, is used to figure out 
which buses are more sensitive to change in generator set point. Using IQR tool, the 4 buses that 







2. Interdependency  
2.1 Introduction  
Many of today’s infrastructures are organized in the form of networks and are becoming 
increasingly interdependent. For example, the power grid and communication networks have a 
cyber-physical interdependency where the power nodes depend on the control signals coming 
from the communication nodes and communication nodes operate using the power coming from 
the power nodes. 
Although interdependency is required for the operation of both networks under normal 
conditions, if a failure happens inside one of the networks it can cascade to the other network. 
For example, if a failure occurs inside the power grid, some of the communication nodes will 
lose their power and fail. As a result, new power nodes lose their control and fail which can lead 
to the failure of additional communication nodes. Thus, a cascade of failures can occur between 
the two networks due to the strong interdependency. 
2.2 Literature Survey 
The concept of interdependence was first introduced by Rinaldi and. Al. In [6],  
the authors described various types of dependencies and different types of the errors that can 
occur in interdependent systems. The impact of failures in the power grid on the performance of 
communication networks was explored in [7]. 
In addition, the authors of [8,9] investigated the effects of power failures on Multilayer 
communication networks, while the authors of [10] studied the effect of the Geographically 




A mathematical model for describing interdependency between two networks was 
developed by Buldyrev et. al. [11]. They modeled each network as a random graph and assumed 
there exist a one-to-one interdependency between the two networks. They considered two 
networks 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵, where node in network 𝐴𝐴 can operate if it is connected to the largest 
connected component in network 𝐴𝐴 and its correspondent node in network 𝐵𝐵 is operating. Using 
percolation theory, they showed that failures spread more in interdependent networks than 
isolated networks; thus, interdependent networks are more vulnerable.  
Following this mathematical modeling, there are some other studies and modeling done 
by the researchers mostly focus on the asymptotic behavior of random networks [12-16].  
There are a few papers on the interdependent networks with known topologies. In [17], the 
authors identified the most vulnerable nodes by defining a new centrality measurement for 
interdependent networks. In [18] and [19], multilayer communication networks where different 
types of interdependency exist have been considered and studied. 
In [20], the robustness of a slightly different version of interdependent network was 
investigated where mutually dependent nodes have the same number of connectivity links. The 
stability of interdependent spatially embedded networks and the impact of geographical attacks 
on the robustness of two interdependent spatially embedded networks were studied in [21] and 
[22], respectively. There are also some studies on designing robust interdependent networks. The 
authors in [23] proposed a strategy based on “betweenness" centrality measures to make a 
minimum number of nodes resilient such that the overall robustness of networks is increased. 
The authors in [24] showed that the robustness of interdependent networks depends on the 




When a power node or line fails, its load is shifted to other elements of the grid. During 
this process, the flow in one or more lines may go beyond their capacity and an overloaded 
situation will happen. So if this overloaded line fail, their power will be redistributed to the other 
line and may lead to further line failure, this phenomena is called “Cascading Failures." The 
cascade of failures in the power grid is a very complex phenomenon, and several models have 
been introduced for explaining its behavior [25-28]. 
 2.3 Types of Interdependency 
Generally, there are two types of interdependency: 
• Unidirectional  
• Bidirectional  
In unidirectional interdependency, interdependent edges are unidirectional. In other 
words, if node 𝑖𝑖 in network 𝐴𝐴 supports node 𝑗𝑗 in network 𝐵𝐵, it is not necessarily supported by 
node j. 
In bidirectional interdependency, interdependent edges are bidirectional. In other words,  if node 
𝑖𝑖 in network 𝐴𝐴 supports node 𝑗𝑗 in network 𝐵𝐵, it is also supported by node 𝑗𝑗. 






Network A Network B Network A Network B
(a) Unidirectional Interdependency (b) Bidirectional Interdependency  
Figure 2-1: Graph structure under different interdependency models 
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The main difference between the cascades of failures in these two networks is the fact 
that in unidirectional networks, a failure can cascade in multiple stages, whereas in a 
bidirectional network, a failure cascades only in one stage. Therefore the bidirectional 
interdependent networks are more robust than the unidirectional interdependent networks due to 
this difference. 
2.4 Modeling Interdependency between Power Grid and Communication Network  
The interdependency model between the power grid and communication network is 
presented in Figure 2-2 [29]. The power grid consists of generators G and substations S, which 
are connected with power lines (Dotted line). Similarly, the communication network consists of 
control centers C and routers R, which are connected with communication links (Solid line). 
Every router receives power from at least one substation and every substation sends data and 
















In this model, a substation is considered in operation when there is a path between this 
substation and a generator. It is also connected to a router if it sends data and receives control 
signals. Similarly, a router is considered in operation, when it has a path to a control center. It is 
also connected to a substation if it receives power. Therefore, a failure in the power grid may 
cause a failure in the communication network and vice versa. 
It is assumed that the power generators have internal control, and the control centers have 
backup generators. In other words, they are robust to failures. In this model power flow 
equations is not considered and it is assumed that the connectivity of a substation to a generator 
is sufficient for receiving power.  
It is also assumed that there is only one generator and one control center. However, this 
model is not fully realistic; it captures the essential properties of interdependent networks. 
2.5 An example of a Single Failure 
An example of a single failure that can cascade multiple times within and between the 
power grid and communication network is presented in Figure 2-3. Suppose that initially 
substation S4 fails (Step 1). As a result, all the edges attached to S4 fail, and router R3 loses its 
power and fails (Step 2); consequently, substations S1 and S3 lose their control, and router R2 
loses its connection to the control center C, and all fail (Step 3). Finally router R1 loses its 



























(a) Step.1 S4 fails, initially
(b) Step.2 R3 fails
(c) Step.3 S1, S3 and R2 fails
X
(c) Step.4  S2 and R1 fails
X
 
Figure 2-3: Cascade of a single failure in an interdependent model 
In contrast, suppose that the power grid is not dependent on the communication network. 
In this case, a substation fails, if and only if it is disconnected from the generator. For example, 
consider only the power grid from Figure 1 and, suppose that substation S4 fails. It can be seen 
that no other substation will be disconnected from the generator; thus, no further failure occurs. 
This example indicates that, while it is essential to their operation, interdependency makes 






3. Neural Network  
3.1 Introduction  
Neural Networks (NN) is important data mining tool used for classification and 
clustering. Neural network can be considered as a machine that mimics the brain activity, and 
tries to learn. 
Basic NN is composed of three main layers namely: 1) input, 2) output and 3) hidden layer. 




Figure 3-1: Simple schematic of basic neural network 
Each layer consists of several numbers of nodes. Nodes at each layer are connected to the 
nodes in the net layers. There is usually some weight associated with every connection. 
Firstly, raw information data is given to the input layer and then this data are multiplied by a 
weight factor and are sent to the hidden layer. These new values are sent to the output layer. 
During the processes of transmission from hidden layer to output layer they are multiplied by 
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another weight factor of connection between hidden layer and output layer. Output layer process 
information received from the hidden layer and produces an output. 
Number of nodes and hidden layer depends on the problem that NN is supposed to solve. 
Generally, the number nodes in input and output layer depends on the training set of data but 
finding the number of node in hidden layer is a bit more challenging. Number hidden layer node 
can be adjusted during training process [31].  
3.2 Training Neural Network 
In training process a set of inputs and their desired output is fed to the network. Input data 
are sent to the hidden layer and then from there are sent to the output layer. Based on the error 
between calculated output and desired output the weights of the connection are adjusted. 
In other words, control of NN is possible through the setting and adjusting the weight at each 
connection. After each iteration, in training process weights are updated. If the result of NN with 
this set of weight is better than the previous iteration the weight set is kept otherwise pervious 
values are kept and iteration goes on.  
Running and training process is done throughout two paths namely forward path and 
backward path. In forward path, the output are calculated and compared with desired output and 
the error is calculated. In backward path, the weights of the connection are changed based on this 
error. These paths are done repeatedly until the error become smaller than a value that is preset 
by the user.   
3.3 Activation Function  
According to [32] activation function is needed for hidden layer of the NN to introduce 
nonlinearity. Without them NN would be same as plain perceptions. Activation function can be 
21 
 
linear, threshold or sigmoid function. Sigmoid activation function is usually used for hidden 
layer because it combines nearly linear behavior, curvilinear behavior and nearly constant [2]. 



















Figure 3-2: Schematic of activation function 
As it is shown in Figure 3, Output from hidden layer node are multiplied to the weight 
associated to connection lines and the sum together to make a single value as a input to Sigmoid 
function. Input to sigmoid is any value between negative infinity and positive infinity number 
while the output can only be a number between 0 and 1.  
3.4 Feed Forward Neural Network  
Feed forward neural network is the first and most simple type of artificial neural network 
developed. In this network, the information moves in one direction, i.e. forward, from the input 
nodes through the hidden nodes and then the output nodes. There is no reverse direction or loop 
in the network. 
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3.5 Back Propagation Algorithm 
Back propagation algorithm is one of the famous and traditional neural network training 
algorithm. After choosing the weights of the network randomly, the back propagation algorithm 
is used to compute the necessary corrections. The back propagation algorithm consist of four 
main step:  
1) Feed-forward computation 
2) Back propagation to the output layer 
3) Back propagation to the hidden layer 
4) Weight updates 
The algorithm will stop when the error function become sufficiently small. For instance, 
in learning process of feed forward neural network with back propagation algorithm, Input data 
from training set is applied to the input layer and then propagates forward to the output layer. At 
output layer based on the activation function outputs are calculated and compared with desired 
value. Then the error signal back propagated from the output layer to the input layer in order to 








4.1 System Under Study 
As mentioned before in this thesis, the IEEE 30 Bus system is used to investigate the 
effectiveness of using neural network as a substitute for the load flow, which will provide 
advantages that will be discussed later within this thesis. In order to increase the controllability 
of active power injection, two synchronous condensers were replaced by synchronous 
generators. This decision was made based on the power flow results obtained from ETAP IEEE 
30 bus example and Matlab load flow by changing one synchronous condenser at a time, and 
observing the system MW losses. Table 4-1 below highlights the changes of the modified IEEE 
30 Bus system. 
Table 4-1: Modified IEEE 30 bus system 
Bus Number Generator Type Maximum MW 
5 Synchronous Generator 100 
11 Synchronous Generator 100 
 
This modification increases the controllability of MW injection of the system under 
study. As a result, generators at buses 2, 5, and 11 can be commanded to inject various amounts 
of active power that will result in different system active power losses. 
4.2 Neural Network Training and Testing 
The modified IEEE 30 bus system allows for a higher controllability of real power 
injection. The MW settings for these generators will impact the active power losses of system; 
this means that the proper settings are required to minimize active power losses. These 
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generators optimal set points can be achieved using different optimization methods such as 
genetic algorithm as in [33], or utilizing power software simulators such as ETAP. However, in 
this thesis a Brute force search algorithm was used to find the combination of generator set 
points that results in minimum active power losses, producing sufficient data for neural network 
training process. Table 4-2 shows a snapshot of the data used to train the Neural Network. 
Table 4-2: Generators active power set points and its corresponding active power Losses 
Generator 2 
Input 
Generator 5  
Input 
Generator 11  
Input 
MW System Losses 
Output 
20 20 20 9.9599 
20 20 30 8.9272 
20 20 40 7.9771 
20 20 50 7.1055 
20 20 60 6.3108 
 
It is clear that upon the change of the loading profile, the generators set points for optimal 
load flow will also change. Therefore, to overcome this, ANN is trained with the same input 
under different loading profiles. In order to illustrate the impact of different load profile on the 
active power losses, the system loading was increased by 100% of its original, where the original 
loading is shown in Appendix B-C. The results of system losses under the new loading profile 





Table 4-3: Generators active power set points and its corresponding active power Losses under 
load profile 2 
Generator 2 
Input 
Generator 5  
Input 
Generator 11  
Input 
MW System Losses 
Output 
20 20 20 36.4211 
20 20 30 34.2902 
20 20 40 32.2340 
20 20 50 30.2556 
 
20 20 60 28.3581 
 
After the neural Network has been trained, it is now tested with random MW set points for the 
two load profiles. Results are shown in table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Comparison between load flow and Neural Network Results 
Gen 2 Gen 5 Gen 11 Load Profile LF Losses ANN Losses 
74     81 80 1 3.6049 3.5872 
51     73 33 1 5.5840 5.5762 
77    22     42 1 5.8978 5.8960 
23     27     86 2 22.8053 22.0369 
29     60     97 2 17.9115 17.2584 




As it can be observed from table 4-4, the results are impressive, although the Neural 
Network was trained with set points that varies 20 MW step, it was able to predict the MW 
system losses very accurately, which makes neural network a great replacement for analysis of 
complex power systems.   
 4.3 Power System Situational Awareness  
Buses voltage magnitude and angle of IEEE 30 bus system can be monitored and even 
calculated using load flow techniques, however monitoring the health of larger system such as 
New York State power grid becomes a challenge due to significant number of buses. However, 
not every bus can tell about the health of the system, such as generator buses as their voltage are 
always close to 1 per unit. Therefore, there must be within the system some buses whose voltage 
magnitude and angle can provide an indication on system conditions. In this thesis, a statistical 
method was used, that is explained in section 1.4, for which the details and equations are 
presented in  [34]. It basically calculates the variability of a given data, in this case, the IQR is 
obtained for voltage and angle for each bus under various combination of generators active 
power injections. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the voltage and angle of bus 6 and bus 5. Bus 6 
experiences the highest voltage IQR, while bus 5 IQR is null, where the MW set point index 
presents the corresponding set points for the generators. Appendix F shows the MW index versus 
the generators set points. As a result buses 6 along with other buses with acceptable IQR, can 










Figure 4-2: Bus 5 voltage and angle plot and histogram 
 
4.4 Power System Loss of Communication  
As discussed before, power system and communication are highly interdependent, and a 
loss of communication can be caused by defects in the communication device, or it can be due to 
loss of power node that empowers the communication device. As a result, loss of communication 
node may lead to a grid failure, which in turn may cause a grid blackout. In this section, a flow 





Figure 4-3: Cause of communication and preliminary actions. 
On the one hand, whether the loss of communication is due to the power loss, or 
communication defectiveness, optimal power flow can still be granted thanks to neural networks.  
The first step into solving this problem is by comparing the results of the selected buses (based 
on IQR) of both neural network and actual measured values of Vpu and power angle, if the 
difference in values is within a minimum error, then one can conclude that this is a 
communication device issue, and to rest assure that this is nothing but a communication problem, 
the previous step can be repeated with slightly different generators set points. In this case, 
generators can be still set to minimize active power losing with using the last known generator 
MW injection with the help of neural networks, which will effectively generate MW set points 
for the remaining generators. Table 4-5 shows the few cases of assumed lost generator with its 
known last MW injection, and the corresponding MW set points for the remaining two 
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2 30 5 60 11 100 2.87 
5 76 2 40 11 100 2.99 
11 96 2 65 5 50 2.80 
 
On the other`` hand, the loss of communication may be due to power loss due to the loss 
of a generator, in this case the comparison of neural network results and the measurements can 
reveal a very high difference between the results, which indicates and confirms that the 
generators have been disconnected, and proper action such as load shedding has to be taken. In 
addition, neural network optimal power flow can be used to minimize the active power losses 
with setting the MW of the remaining generators. 
4.5 Case Studies 
In these scenarios the 30 Bus system is assumed to operate at its original loading, and 
suddenly sequence of events took place as shown in details below: 
1) Loss of communication  
2) Increase in load by a factor of 1.5 
3)  Loss of generator 2 
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This sequence of events can be identified and confirmed using neural network, meaning 
that NN is able to distinguish between communication loss and generator loss. Table 4-6 shows 
Vpu of all busses obtained from both load flow and NN, and the mean square error upon the 
occurrence of event 1. Table 4-7 shows the generators MW set points obtained from NN before 
the occurrence of event 1. 
Table 4-6: LF & NN Vpu corresponding to event 1 
Bus Number LF Vpu NN Vpu % Error 
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.0027 
2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0033 
3 0.9818 0.9738 0.8182 
4 0.9771 0.9763 0.0871 
5 1.0000 0.9991 0.0860 
6 0.9804 0.9826 0.2194 
7 0.9793 0.9784 0.0899 
8 0.9800 0.9798 0.0203 
9 0.9925 0.9879 0.4651 
10 0.9931 0.9933 0.0228 
11 1.0000 0.9986 0.1429 
12 0.9959 0.9992 0.3292 
13 1.0000 0.9977 0.2347 
14 0.9814 0.9820 0.0637 
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15 0.9804 0.9825 0.2101 
16 0.9876 0.9882 0.0581 
17 0.9860 0.9852 0.0815 
18 0.9721 0.9726 0.0596 
19 0.9704 0.9723 0.1932 
20 0.9753 0.9734 0.1973 
21 0.9765 0.9811 0.4696 
22 0.9847 0.9828 0.1961 
23 0.9759 0.9745 0.1515 
24 0.9724 0.9725 0.0098 
25 0.9720 0.9720 0.0045 
26 0.9535 0.9783 2.6022 
27 0.9811 0.9865 0.5511 
28 0.9785 0.9767 0.1815 
29 0.9603 0.9603 0.0002 
30 0.9483 0.9560 0.8096 
 
Table 4-7: Generators MW set points before event 1 
G2 MW G5 MW G11 MW 




While training the neural network, one can stop training it at any desired mean square 
error. In addition, it is up to the user to set an average MSE threshold calculated from all buses, 
which allows the differentiation between communication loss and generator loss. 
In this thesis, all neural networks are trained to achieve a mean square error of a maximum of 
0.05%, and the average MSE threshold utilized is 0.5%. The average MSE threshold is identified 
based on comparing and observing the difference in Vpu in the case of generators running and 
generators out of service for all generators individually.  
From the results of Table 4-6, the average mean square error is 0.2787%, which tell us 
that is within acceptable range, therefore, the loss of communication is due to communication 
device only.  
In the following event, while the system is experiencing loss of communication to 
generator 2, the load increases by a factor of 1.5, which will require a different MW set points 
for the generators. Table 4-8 shows the voltages and the MSE, and table 4-9 shows the new MW 
generators set points as per neural network.  
Table 4-8: LF & NN Vpu corresponding to event 2 
Bus Number LF Vpu NN Vpu % Error 
1 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
2 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
3 0.9667 0.9667 0.0000 
4 0.9587 0.9587 0.0000 
5 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
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6 0.9599 0.9598 0.0104 
7 0.9612 0.9602 0.1040 
8 0.9600 0.9611 0.1146 
9 0.9689 0.9687 0.0206 
10 0.9571 0.9596 0.2612 
11 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
12 0.9733 0.9825 0.9452 
13 1.0000 0.9986 0.1400 
14 0.9488 0.9484 0.0422 
15 0.9444 0.9483 0.4130 
16 0.9552 0.9513 0.4083 
17 0.9479 0.9489 0.1055 
18 0.9286 0.9287 0.0108 
19 0.9244 0.9246 0.0216 
20 0.9313 0.9266 0.5047 
21 0.9320 0.9385 0.6974 
22 0.9425 0.9425 0.0000 
23 0.9315 0.9316 0.0107 
24 0.9220 0.9287 0.7267 
25 0.9222 0.9220 0.0217 
26 0.8924 0.8924 0.0000 
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27 0.9370 0.9370 0.0000 
28 0.9539 0.9539 0.0000 
29 0.9030 0.9030 0.0000 
30 0.8834 0.8834 0.0000 
 
Table 4-9: Generators MW set points after event 2 
G2 MW G5 MW G11 MW 
80 75 100 
 
While the system is made aware of the new loading profile, neural network is used to 
generate the new MW generators set points and Vpu. Based on the results, the average mean 
square error is 0.1520% which is again within the acceptable range, as a results, we can conclude 
that generator 2 is still on service.  
Finally, while waiting for the communication issue to be fixed, this generator may 
actually be disconnected from the rest of the system due to a possibly  short circuit .However, the 
health of the system is constantly monitored using the Vpu simulated from neural network, so the 
results should be able to conclude a generator failure. Table 4-10 shows the Vpu after the loss of 






Table 4-10: LF & NN Vpu corresponding to event 3 
Bus Number LF Vpu NN Vpu % Error 
1 1.0000 1.0103 1.0300 
2 0.9900 1.0000 1.0101 
3 0.9641 0.9667 0.2662 
4 0.9557 0.9587 0.3151 
5 1.0000 0.9585 4.1500 
6 0.9580 0.9598 0.1831 
7 0.9602 0.9602 0.0005 
8 0.9600 0.9611 0.1146 
9 0.9677 0.9687 0.1037 
10 0.9557 0.9856 3.1242 
11 1.0000 0.9980 0.2000 
12 0.9721 0.9825 1.0654 
13 1.0000 0.9537 4.6300 
14 0.9476 0.9484 0.0852 
15 0.9431 0.9483 0.5488 
16 0.9539 0.9513 0.2746 
17 0.9466 0.9489 0.2457 
18 0.9273 0.9287 0.1562 
19 0.9231 0.9246 0.1679 
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20 0.9299 0.9266 0.3535 
21 0.9306 0.9385 0.8469 
22 0.9411 0.9425 0.1480 
23 0.9301 0.9316 0.1627 
24 0.9205 0.9287 0.8865 
25 0.9206 0.9220 0.1566 
26 0.8908 0.8924 0.1840 
27 0.9354 0.9370 0.1749 
28 0.9524 0.9539 0.1586 
29 0.9013 0.9030 0.1877 
30 0.8817 0.8834 0.1971 
 
The average mean square error obtained from the results is 0.7043% which is above the 
threshold, and since the load profile remain constant at 150%, therefore, it is evident that not 







In this thesis, an approach for mitigating interdependence between the power grid and the 
communication network has been developed. This approach has been based on a trained artificial 
neural network that can rapidly estimate the actual state of the system. The output from the 
neural network was used to validate the measurements received by the SCADA system to detect 
communication network malfunction. 
The neural network showed very high performance in prediction even though it does not 
need every detail about the system in study. As witnessed from the result section, ANN can be 
used to monitor the health of the power system, and accurately distinguish the loss of 
communication due to defects in communication device, from the loss of communication that is 
due to power loss, therefore increasing the awareness of power system operators about the health 
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Partial Description of the IEEE Common Data Format for the     
Exchange of Solved Load Flow Data 
 
The complete description can be found in the paper "Common Data 
Format for the Exchange of Solved Load Flow Data", Working Group on a 
Common Format for the Exchange of Solved Load Flow Data, _IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems_, Vol. PAS-92, No. 6, 
November/December 1973, pp. 1916-1925. 
 
The data file has lines of up to 128 characters. The lines are grouped 
into sections with section headers. Data items are entered in specific 
columns. No blank items are allowed, enter zeros instead. Floating point 
items should have explicit decimal point. No implicit decimal points 
are used. 
 
Data type codes: A - Alphanumeric (no special characters) 
                 I - Integer 
                 F - Floating point 





First card in file. 
 
Columns  2- 9   Date, in format DD/MM/YY with leading zeros. If no date 
                provided, use 0b/0b/0b where b is blank. 
 
Columns 11-30   Originator's name (A) 
 
Columns 32-37   MVA Base (F*) 
 
Columns 39-42   Year (I) 
 
Column  44      Season (S - Summer, W - Winter) 
 
Column  46-73   Case identification (A) 
 
Bus Data * 
========== 
 
Section start card *: 
--------------------- 
 
Columns  1-16   BUS DATA FOLLOWS (not clear that any more than BUS in 
                1-3 is significant) * 
 
Columns  ?- ?   NNNNN ITEMS (column not clear, I would not count on this) 
 
Bus data cards *: 
----------------- 
 
Columns  1- 4   Bus number (I) * 
Columns  7-17   Name (A) (left justify) * 
44 
 
Columns 19-20   Load flow area number (I) Don't use zero! * 
Columns 21-23   Loss zone number (I) 
Columns 25-26   Type (I) * 
                 0 - Unregulated (load, PQ) 
                 1 - Hold MVAR generation within voltage limits, (PQ) 
                 2 - Hold voltage within VAR limits (gen, PV) 
                 3 - Hold voltage and angle (swing, V-Theta) (must always 
                      have one) 
Columns 28-33   Final voltage, p.u. (F) * 
Columns 34-40   Final angle, degrees (F) * 
Columns 41-49   Load MW (F) * 
Columns 50-59   Load MVAR (F) * 
Columns 60-67   Generation MW (F) * 
Columns 68-75   Generation MVAR (F) * 
Columns 77-83   Base KV (F) 
Columns 85-90   Desired volts (pu) (F) (This is desired remote voltage if 
                this bus is controlling another bus. 
Columns 91-98   Maximum MVAR or voltage limit (F) 
Columns 99-106  Minimum MVAR or voltage limit (F) 
Columns 107-114 Shunt conductance G (per unit) (F) * 
Columns 115-122 Shunt susceptance B (per unit) (F) * 
Columns 124-127 Remote controlled bus number 
 
Section end card: 
----------------- 
 
Columns  1- 4   -999 
 
Branch Data * 
============= 
 
Section start card *: 
--------------------- 
 
Columns  1-16   BRANCH DATA FOLLOWS (not clear that any more than BRANCH 
                is significant) * 
 
Columns 40?- ?  NNNNN ITEMS (column not clear, I would not count on this) 
 
Branch data cards *: 
-------------------- 
 
Columns  1- 4   Tap bus number (I) * 
                 For transformers or phase shifters, the side of the model 
                 the non-unity tap is on 
Columns  6- 9   Z bus number (I) * 
                 For transformers and phase shifters, the side of the model 
                 the device impedance is on. 
Columns 11-12   Load flow area (I) 
Columns 13-14   Loss zone (I) 
Column  17      Circuit (I) * (Use 1 for single lines) 
Column  19      Type (I) * 
                 0 - Transmission line 
                 1 - Fixed tap 
                 2 - Variable tap for voltage control (TCUL, LTC) 
                 3 - Variable tap (turns ratio) for MVAR control 
                 4 - Variable phase angle for MW control (phase shifter) 
45 
 
Columns 20-29   Branch resistance R, per unit (F) * 
Columns 30-40   Branch reactance X, per unit (F) * No zero impedance lines 
Columns 41-50   Line charging B, per unit (F) * (total line charging, +B) 
Columns 51-55   Line MVA rating No 1 (I) Left justify! 
Columns 57-61   Line MVA rating No 2 (I) Left justify! 
Columns 63-67   Line MVA rating No 3 (I) Left justify! 
Columns 69-72   Control bus number 
Column  74      Side (I) 
                 0 - Controlled bus is one of the terminals 
                 1 - Controlled bus is near the tap side 
                 2 - Controlled bus is near the impedance side (Z bus) 
Columns 77-82   Transformer final turns ratio (F) 
Columns 84-90   Transformer (phase shifter) final angle (F) 
Columns 91-97   Minimum tap or phase shift (F) 
Columns 98-104  Maximum tap or phase shift (F) 
Columns 106-111 Step size (F) 
Columns 113-119 Minimum voltage, MVAR or MW limit (F) 
Columns 120-126 Maximum voltage, MVAR or MW limit (F) 
 
Section end card: 
----------------- 
 
Columns  1- 4   -999 
 
Loss Zone Data 
============== 
 
Section start card 
------------------ 
 
Columns  1-16   LOSS ZONES FOLLOWS (not clear that any more than LOSS 
                is significant) 
 
Columns 40?- ?  NNNNN ITEMS (column not clear, I would not count on this) 
 
Loss Zone Cards: 
---------------- 
 
Columns  1- 3   Loss zone number  (I) 
Columns  5-16   Loss zone name (A) 
 
Section end card: 
----------------- 
 
Columns  1- 3   -99 
 
Interchange Data * 
================== 
 
Section start card 
------------------ 
 
Columns  1-16   INTERCHANGE DATA FOLLOWS (not clear that any more than  
                first word is significant). 
Columns 40?- ?  NNNNN ITEMS (column not clear, I would not count on this) 
 





Columns  1- 2   Area number (I) no zeros! * 
Columns  4- 7   Interchange slack bus number (I) * 
Columns  9-20   Alternate swing bus name (A) 
Columns 21-28   Area interchange export, MW (F) (+ = out) * 
Columns 30-35   Area interchange tolerance, MW (F) * 
Columns 38-43   Area code (abbreviated name) (A) * 
Columns 46-75   Area name (A) 
 
Section end card: 
----------------- 
 
Columns  1- 2   -9 
 
Tie Line Data 
============= 
 
Section start card 
------------------ 
 
Columns  1-16   TIE LINES FOLLOW (not clear that any more than TIE 
                is significant) 
 
Columns 40?- ?  NNNNN ITEMS (column not clear, I would not count on this) 
 
Tie Line Cards: 
--------------- 
 
Columns  1- 4   Metered bus number (I) 
Columns  7-8    Metered area number (I) 
Columns  11-14  Non-metered bus number (I) 
Columns  17-18  Non-metered area number (I) 
Column   21     Circuit number 
 
Section end card: 
----------------- 
 



















08/20/93 UW ARCHIVE           100.0  1961 W IEEE 30 Bus Test Case 
BUS DATA FOLLOWS                            30 ITEMS 
   1 Glen Lyn 132  1  1  3 1.060    0.0      0.0      0.0    260.2   -16.1   
132.0  1.060     0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   2 Claytor  132  1  1  2 1.043  -5.48     21.7     12.7     40.0    50.0   
132.0  1.045    50.0   -40.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   3 Kumis    132  1  1  0 1.021  -7.96      2.4      1.2      0.0     0.0   
132.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   4 Hancock  132  1  1  0 1.012  -9.62      7.6      1.6      0.0     0.0   
132.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   5 Fieldale 132  1  1  2 1.010 -14.37     94.2     19.0      0.0    37.0   
132.0  1.010    40.0   -40.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   6 Roanoke  132  1  1  0 1.010 -11.34      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0   
132.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   7 Blaine   132  1  1  0 1.002 -13.12     22.8     10.9      0.0     0.0   
132.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   8 Reusens  132  1  1  2 1.010 -12.10     30.0     30.0      0.0    37.3   
132.0  1.010    40.0   -10.0   0.0    0.0        0 
   9 Roanoke  1.0  1  1  0 1.051 -14.38      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0     
1.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  10 Roanoke   33  1  1  0 1.045 -15.97      5.8      2.0      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.19       0 
  11 Roanoke   11  1  1  2 1.082 -14.39      0.0      0.0      0.0    16.2    
11.0  1.082    24.0    -6.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  12 Hancock   33  1  1  0 1.057 -15.24     11.2      7.5      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  13 Hancock   11  1  1  2 1.071 -15.24      0.0      0.0      0.0    10.6    
11.0  1.071    24.0    -6.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  14 Bus 14    33  1  1  0 1.042 -16.13      6.2      1.6      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  15 Bus 15    33  1  1  0 1.038 -16.22      8.2      2.5      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  16 Bus 16    33  1  1  0 1.045 -15.83      3.5      1.8      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  17 Bus 17    33  1  1  0 1.040 -16.14      9.0      5.8      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  18 Bus 18    33  1  1  0 1.028 -16.82      3.2      0.9      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  19 Bus 19    33  1  1  0 1.026 -17.00      9.5      3.4      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  20 Bus 20    33  1  1  0 1.030 -16.80      2.2      0.7      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  21 Bus 21    33  1  1  0 1.033 -16.42     17.5     11.2      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  22 Bus 22    33  1  1  0 1.033 -16.41      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  23 Bus 23    33  1  1  0 1.027 -16.61      3.2      1.6      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  24 Bus 24    33  1  1  0 1.021 -16.78      8.7      6.7      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.043      0 
  25 Bus 25    33  1  1  0 1.017 -16.35      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
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  26 Bus 26    33  1  1  0 1.000 -16.77      3.5      2.3      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  27 Cloverdle 33  1  1  0 1.023 -15.82      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  28 Cloverdle132  1  1  0 1.007 -11.97      0.0      0.0      0.0     0.0   
132.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  29 Bus 29    33  1  1  0 1.003 -17.06      2.4      0.9      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
  30 Bus 30    33  1  1  0 0.992 -17.94     10.6      1.9      0.0     0.0    
33.0  0.0       0.0     0.0   0.0    0.0        0 
-999  
BRANCH DATA FOLLOWS                         41 ITEMS 
   1    2  1  1 1 0  0.0192    0.0575      0.0528     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   1    3  1  1 1 0  0.0452    0.1652      0.0408     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   2    4  1  1 1 0  0.0570    0.1737      0.0368     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   3    4  1  1 1 0  0.0132    0.0379      0.0084     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   2    5  1  1 1 0  0.0472    0.1983      0.0418     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   2    6  1  1 1 0  0.0581    0.1763      0.0374     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   4    6  1  1 1 0  0.0119    0.0414      0.0090     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   5    7  1  1 1 0  0.0460    0.1160      0.0204     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   6    7  1  1 1 0  0.0267    0.0820      0.0170     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   6    8  1  1 1 0  0.0120    0.0420      0.0090     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   6    9  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.2080      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.978     0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   6   10  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.5560      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.969     0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   9   11  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.2080      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   9   10  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.1100      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   4   12  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.2560      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.932     0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  12   13  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.1400      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  12   14  1  1 1 0  0.1231    0.2559      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  12   15  1  1 1 0  0.0662    0.1304      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  12   16  1  1 1 0  0.0945    0.1987      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  14   15  1  1 1 0  0.2210    0.1997      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  16   17  1  1 1 0  0.0524    0.1923      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  15   18  1  1 1 0  0.1073    0.2185      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
49 
 
  18   19  1  1 1 0  0.0639    0.1292      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  19   20  1  1 1 0  0.0340    0.0680      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  10   20  1  1 1 0  0.0936    0.2090      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  10   17  1  1 1 0  0.0324    0.0845      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  10   21  1  1 1 0  0.0348    0.0749      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  10   22  1  1 1 0  0.0727    0.1499      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  21   22  1  1 1 0  0.0116    0.0236      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  15   23  1  1 1 0  0.1000    0.2020      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  22   24  1  1 1 0  0.1150    0.1790      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  23   24  1  1 1 0  0.1320    0.2700      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  24   25  1  1 1 0  0.1885    0.3292      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  25   26  1  1 1 0  0.2544    0.3800      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  25   27  1  1 1 0  0.1093    0.2087      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  28   27  1  1 1 0  0.0       0.3960      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.968     0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  27   29  1  1 1 0  0.2198    0.4153      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  27   30  1  1 1 0  0.3202    0.6027      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
  29   30  1  1 1 0  0.2399    0.4533      0.0        0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   8   28  1  1 1 0  0.0636    0.2000      0.0428     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
   6   28  1  1 1 0  0.0169    0.0599      0.0130     0     0     0    0 0  
0.0       0.0 0.0    0.0     0.0    0.0   0.0 
-999 
LOSS ZONES FOLLOWS                     1 ITEMS 
  1 IEEE 30 BUS 
-99 
INTERCHANGE DATA FOLLOWS                 1 ITEMS 
-9 
 1    2 Claytor  132    0.0  999.99  IEEE30  IEEE 30 Bus Test Case 
TIE LINES FOLLOWS                     0 ITEMS 
-999 











% Program for Newton-Raphson Load Flow Analysis.. 
nbus = 30;                  % IEEE-14, IEEE-30, IEEE-57.. 
linedata_org = xlsread('linedat30.xlsx');      % Calling Linedatas... 
busd_org=xlsread('bus30Info.xlsx');      % Calling busdatas.. 
%% Y-Bus Matrix.. 
linedata = linedata_org;      % Calling Linedatas... 
fb = linedata(:,1);             % From bus number... 
tb = linedata(:,2);             % To bus number... 
r = linedata(:,3);              % Resistance, R... 
x = linedata(:,4);              % Reactance, X... 
b = linedata(:,5);              % Ground Admittance, B/2... 
a = linedata(:,6);              % Tap setting value.. 
z = r + 1i*x;                    % z matrix... 
y = 1./z;                       % To get inverse of each element... 
b = 1i*b;                        % Make B imaginary...  
nb = max(max(fb),max(tb));      % No. of buses... 
nl = length(fb);                % No. of branches... 
Y = zeros(nb,nb);               % Initialise YBus... 
  
 % Formation of the Off Diagonal Elements... 
 for k = 1:nl 
     Y(fb(k),tb(k)) = Y(fb(k),tb(k)) - y(k)/a(k); 
     Y(tb(k),fb(k)) = Y(fb(k),tb(k)); 
 end 
  
 % Formation of Diagonal Elements.... 
 for m = 1:nb 
     for n = 1:nl 
         if fb(n) == m 
             Y(m,m) = Y(m,m) + y(n)/(a(n)^2) + b(n); 
         elseif tb(n) == m 
             Y(m,m) = Y(m,m) + y(n) + b(n); 
         end 
     end 
 end 
 %Y;                  % Bus Admittance Matrix 
 %Z = inv(Y);      % Bus Impedance Matrix 
  
%% 
busd = busd_org; 
BMva = 100;                 % Base MVA.. 
bus = busd(:,1);            % Bus Number.. 
type = busd(:,2);           % Type of Bus 1-Slack, 2-PV, 3-PQ.. 
V = busd(:,3);              % Specified Voltage.. 
del = busd(:,4);            % Voltage Angle.. 
Pg = busd(:,5)/BMva;        % PGi.. 
Qg = busd(:,6)/BMva;        % QGi.. 
Pl = busd(:,7)/BMva;        % PLi.. 
Ql = busd(:,8)/BMva;        % QLi.. 
Qmin = busd(:,9)/BMva;      % Minimum Reactive Power Limit.. 
Qmax = busd(:,10)/BMva;     % Maximum Reactive Power Limit.. 
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P = Pg - Pl;                % Pi = PGi - PLi.. 
Q = Qg - Ql;                % Qi = QGi - QLi.. 
Psp = P;                    % P Specified.. 
Qsp = Q;                    % Q Specified.. 
G = real(Y);                % Conductance matrix.. 
B = imag(Y);                % Susceptance matrix.. 
  
pv = find(type == 2 | type == 1);   % PV Buses.. 
pq = find(type == 3);               % PQ Buses.. 
npv = length(pv);                   % No. of PV buses.. 
npq = length(pq);                   % No. of PQ buses.. 
  
Tol = 1;   
Iter = 1; 
while (Tol > 1e-5)   % Iteration starting.. 
     
    P = zeros(nbus,1); 
    Q = zeros(nbus,1); 
    % Calculate P and Q 
    for i = 1:nbus 
        for k = 1:nbus 
            P(i) = P(i) + V(i)* V(k)*(G(i,k)*cos(del(i)-del(k)) + 
B(i,k)*sin(del(i)-del(k))); 
            Q(i) = Q(i) + V(i)* V(k)*(G(i,k)*sin(del(i)-del(k)) - 
B(i,k)*cos(del(i)-del(k))); 
        end 
    end 
  
    % Checking Q-limit violations.. 
    if Iter <= 7 && Iter > 2    % Only checked up to 7th iterations.. 
        for n = 2:nbus 
            if type(n) == 2 
                QG = Q(n)+Ql(n); 
                if QG < Qmin(n) 
                    V(n) = V(n) + 0.01; 
                elseif QG > Qmax(n) 
                    V(n) = V(n) - 0.01; 
                end 
            end 
         end 
    end 
     
    % Calculate change from specified value 
    dPa = Psp-P; 
    dQa = Qsp-Q; 
    k = 1; 
    dQ = zeros(npq,1); 
    for i = 1:nbus 
        if type(i) == 3 
            dQ(k,1) = dQa(i); 
            k = k+1; 
        end 
    end 
    dP = dPa(2:nbus); 
    M = [dP; dQ];       % Mismatch Vector 
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    % Jacobian 
    % J1 - Derivative of Real Power Injections with Angles.. 
    J1 = zeros(nbus-1,nbus-1); 
    for i = 1:(nbus-1) 
        m = i+1; 
        for k = 1:(nbus-1) 
            n = k+1; 
            if n == m 
                for n = 1:nbus 
                    J1(i,k) = J1(i,k) + V(m)* V(n)*(-G(m,n)*sin(del(m)-
del(n)) + B(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n))); 
                end 
                J1(i,k) = J1(i,k) - V(m)^2*B(m,m); 
            else 
                J1(i,k) = V(m)* V(n)*(G(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n)) - 
B(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n))); 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    % J2 - Derivative of Real Power Injections with V.. 
    J2 = zeros(nbus-1,npq); 
    for i = 1:(nbus-1) 
        m = i+1; 
        for k = 1:npq 
            n = pq(k); 
            if n == m 
                for n = 1:nbus 
                    J2(i,k) = J2(i,k) + V(n)*(G(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n)) + 
B(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n))); 
                end 
                J2(i,k) = J2(i,k) + V(m)*G(m,m); 
            else 
                J2(i,k) = V(m)*(G(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n)) + 
B(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n))); 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    % J3 - Derivative of Reactive Power Injections with Angles.. 
    J3 = zeros(npq,nbus-1); 
    for i = 1:npq 
        m = pq(i); 
        for k = 1:(nbus-1) 
            n = k+1; 
            if n == m 
                for n = 1:nbus 
                    J3(i,k) = J3(i,k) + V(m)* V(n)*(G(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n)) 
+ B(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n))); 
                end 
                J3(i,k) = J3(i,k) - V(m)^2*G(m,m); 
            else 
                J3(i,k) = V(m)* V(n)*(-G(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n)) - 
B(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n))); 
            end 
        end 
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    end 
     
    % J4 - Derivative of Reactive Power Injections with V.. 
    J4 = zeros(npq,npq); 
    for i = 1:npq 
        m = pq(i); 
        for k = 1:npq 
            n = pq(k); 
            if n == m 
                for n = 1:nbus 
                    J4(i,k) = J4(i,k) + V(n)*(G(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n)) - 
B(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n))); 
                end 
                J4(i,k) = J4(i,k) - V(m)*B(m,m); 
            else 
                J4(i,k) = V(m)*(G(m,n)*sin(del(m)-del(n)) - 
B(m,n)*cos(del(m)-del(n))); 
            end 
        end 
    end 
     
    J = [J1 J2; J3 J4];     % Jacobian Matrix.. 
     
    X = inv(J)*M;           % Correction Vector 
    dTh = X(1:nbus-1);      % Change in Voltage Angle.. 
    dV = X(nbus:end);       % Change in Voltage Magnitude.. 
     
    % Updating State Vectors.. 
    del(2:nbus) = dTh + del(2:nbus);    % Voltage Angle.. 
    k = 1; 
    for i = 2:nbus 
        if type(i) == 3 
            V(i) = dV(k) + V(i);        % Voltage Magnitude.. 
            k = k+1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    Iter = Iter + 1; 
    Tol = max(abs(M));                  % Tolerance.. 
     
end 
  
%% Program for Bus Power Injections, Line & Power flows (p.u)...             
lined =linedata_org; 
busd= busd_org; % Get busdatas 
Vm = pol2rect(V,del);           % Converting polar to rectangular.. 
Del = 180/pi*del;               % Bus Voltage Angles in Degree... 
fb = lined(:,1);                % From bus number... 
tb = lined(:,2);                % To bus number... 
nl = length(fb);                % No. of Branches.. 
Pl = busd(:,7);                 % PLi.. 
Ql = busd(:,8);                 % QLi.. 
  
Iij = zeros(nb,nb); 
Sij = zeros(nb,nb); 
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Si = zeros(nb,1); 
  
% Bus Current Injections.. 
 I = Y*Vm; 
 Im = abs(I); 
 Ia = angle(I); 
 amps=zeros(41,3); 
%Line Current Flows.. 
for m = 1:nl 
    p = fb(m); q = tb(m); 
    Iij(p,q) = -(Vm(p) - Vm(q))*Y(p,q); % Y(m,n) = -y(m,n).. 
    %------------------------- 
    amps(m,1)=p; 
    amps(m,2)=q; 
    amps(m,3)=abs(Iij(p,q)); 
    %------------------------- 
    Iij(q,p) = -Iij(p,q); 
end 
  
Iijm = abs(Iij); 
Iija = angle(Iij); 
  
% Line Power Flows.. 
for m = 1:nb 
    for n = 1:nb 
        if m ~= n 
            Sij(m,n) = Vm(m)*conj(Iij(m,n))*BMva; 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
Pij = real(Sij); 
Qij = imag(Sij); 
  
% Line Losses.. 
Lij = zeros(nl,1); 
for m = 1:nl 
    p = fb(m); q = tb(m); 
    Lij(m) = Sij(p,q) + Sij(q,p); 
end 
Lpij = real(Lij); 
Lqij = imag(Lij); 
  
% Bus Power Injections.. 
for i = 1:nb 
    for k = 1:nb 
        Si(i) = Si(i) + conj(Vm(i))* Vm(k)*Y(i,k)*BMva; 
    end 
end 
Pi = real(Si); 
Qi = -imag(Si); 
Pg = Pi+Pl; 








%disp('                              Newton Raphson Loadflow Analysis '); 
%disp('----------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------'); 
%disp('| Bus |    V   |  Angle  |     Injection      |     Generation     |          
Load      |'); 
%disp('| No  |   pu   |  Degree |    MW   |   MVar   |    MW   |  Mvar    |     
MW     |  MVar | '); 
 data1=zeros(30,9); 
for m = 1:nb 
    data1(m,1)=m; 
    data1(m,2)=V(m); 
    data1(m,3)=Del(m); 
    data1(m,4)=Pi(m);  
    data1(m,5)=Qi(m);  
    data1(m,6)=Pg(m);  
    data1(m,7)=Qg(m);  
    data1(m,8)=Pl(m);  
    data1(m,9)=Ql(m); 
end 
  
total_Inj_MW  =sum(Pi);  
total_Inj_MVar =sum(Qi);  





%disp('                              Line FLow and Losses '); 
  
%disp('|From|To |    P    |    Q     | From| To |    P     |   Q     |      
Line Loss      |'); 
%disp('|Bus |Bus|   MW    |   MVar   | Bus | Bus|    MW    |  MVar   |     MW   
|    MVar  |'); 
data2=zeros(41,10); 
for m = 1:nl 
    p = fb(m); q = tb(m); 
    data2(m,1)=p; 
    data2(m,2)=q; 
    data2(m,3)=Pij(p,q); 
    data2(m,4)=Qij(p,q);  
    data2(m,5)=q;  
    data2(m,6)=p;  
    data2(m,7)=Pij(q,p);  
    data2(m,8)=Qij(q,p); 
    data2(m,9)=Lpij(m);  









MW Index G2 MW G5 MW G11 MW 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 20 
3 0 0 40 
4 0 0 60 
5 0 0 80 
6 0 0 100 
7 0 20 0 
8 0 20 20 
9 0 20 40 
10 0 20 60 
11 0 20 80 
12 0 20 100 
13 0 40 0 
14 0 40 20 
15 0 40 40 
16 0 40 60 
17 0 40 80 
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18 0 40 100 
19 0 60 0 
20 0 60 20 
21 0 60 40 
22 0 60 60 
23 0 60 80 
24 0 60 100 
25 0 80 0 
26 0 80 20 
27 0 80 40 
28 0 80 60 
29 0 80 80 
30 0 80 100 
31 0 100 0 
32 0 100 20 
33 0 100 40 
34 0 100 60 
35 0 100 80 
36 0 100 100 
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37 20 0 0 
38 20 0 20 
39 20 0 40 
40 20 0 60 
41 20 0 80 
42 20 0 100 
43 20 20 0 
44 20 20 20 
45 20 20 40 
46 20 20 60 
47 20 20 80 
48 20 20 100 
49 20 40 0 
50 20 40 20 
51 20 40 40 
52 20 40 60 
53 20 40 80 
54 20 40 100 
55 20 60 0 
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56 20 60 20 
57 20 60 40 
58 20 60 60 
59 20 60 80 
60 20 60 100 
61 20 80 0 
62 20 80 20 
63 20 80 40 
64 20 80 60 
65 20 80 80 
66 20 80 100 
67 20 100 0 
68 20 100 20 
69 20 100 40 
70 20 100 60 
71 20 100 80 
72 20 100 100 
73 40 0 0 
74 40 0 20 
60 
 
75 40 0 40 
76 40 0 60 
77 40 0 80 
78 40 0 100 
79 40 20 0 
80 40 20 20 
81 40 20 40 
82 40 20 60 
83 40 20 80 
84 40 20 100 
85 40 40 0 
86 40 40 20 
87 40 40 40 
88 40 40 60 
89 40 40 80 
90 40 40 100 
91 40 60 0 
92 40 60 20 
93 40 60 40 
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94 40 60 60 
95 40 60 80 
96 40 60 100 
97 40 80 0 
98 40 80 20 
99 40 80 40 
100 40 80 60 
101 40 80 80 
102 40 80 100 
103 40 100 0 
104 40 100 20 
105 40 100 40 
106 40 100 60 
107 40 100 80 
108 40 100 100 
109 60 0 0 
110 60 0 20 
111 60 0 40 
112 60 0 60 
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113 60 0 80 
114 60 0 100 
115 60 20 0 
116 60 20 20 
117 60 20 40 
118 60 20 60 
119 60 20 80 
120 60 20 100 
121 60 40 0 
122 60 40 20 
123 60 40 40 
124 60 40 60 
125 60 40 80 
126 60 40 100 
127 60 60 0 
128 60 60 20 
129 60 60 40 
130 60 60 60 
131 60 60 80 
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132 60 60 100 
133 60 80 0 
134 60 80 20 
135 60 80 40 
136 60 80 60 
137 60 80 80 
138 60 80 100 
139 60 100 0 
140 60 100 20 
141 60 100 40 
142 60 100 60 
143 60 100 80 
144 60 100 100 
145 80 0 0 
146 80 0 20 
147 80 0 40 
148 80 0 60 
149 80 0 80 
150 80 0 100 
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151 80 20 0 
152 80 20 20 
153 80 20 40 
154 80 20 60 
155 80 20 80 
156 80 20 100 
157 80 40 0 
158 80 40 20 
159 80 40 40 
160 80 40 60 
161 80 40 80 
162 80 40 100 
163 80 60 0 
164 80 60 20 
165 80 60 40 
166 80 60 60 
167 80 60 80 
168 80 60 100 
169 80 80 0 
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170 80 80 20 
171 80 80 40 
172 80 80 60 
173 80 80 80 
174 80 80 100 
175 80 100 0 
176 80 100 20 
177 80 100 40 
178 80 100 60 
179 80 100 80 
180 80 100 100 
181 100 0 0 
182 100 0 20 
183 100 0 40 
184 100 0 60 
185 100 0 80 
186 100 0 100 
187 100 20 0 
188 100 20 20 
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189 100 20 40 
190 100 20 60 
191 100 20 80 
192 100 20 100 
193 100 40 0 
194 100 40 20 
195 100 40 40 
196 100 40 60 
197 100 40 80 
198 100 40 100 
199 100 60 0 
200 100 60 20 
201 100 60 40 
202 100 60 60 
203 100 60 80 
204 100 60 100 
205 100 80 0 
206 100 80 20 
207 100 80 40 
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208 100 80 60 
209 100 80 80 
210 100 80 100 
211 100 100 0 
212 100 100 20 
213 100 100 40 
214 100 100 60 
215 100 100 80 
216 100 100 100 
 
